In short
- Fraudsters ask for bank changes by email, often just before a large payment.
- The number in the request email or letter must not be the one you call.
- Changes should be made by someone other than the person who approves payments.
- A hold on the first payment to new details gives time to catch mistakes.
- A log of every change, with who confirmed it, helps when something goes wrong.
What the check does
The check is a callback. Someone at your company speaks to a person they already know at the supplier, on a phone number that came from the vendor record or the signed contract, and asks that person to read back the new account details and confirm the change is real. The request itself is not confirmation. A letter on letterhead and an email from a familiar address are both just claims until a human on the other end agrees with them.
The reason this matters is the timing of the fraud. Bank change requests usually arrive by email, often as a short polite note, and often shortly before a large payment is due. Picture a packaging supplier with an invoice already approved and scheduled. A message arrives asking for the remittance account to be updated. The supplier name stays the same, the invoice number stays the same, only the account digits move. If that payment leaves on the old schedule, the money lands with a stranger and the real supplier is still owed.
The callback catches honest mistakes too, and they are more common than fraud. A contract manufacturer reorganizes its treasury team and sends new details with a digit out of place. A freight carrier changes banks after a merger and the new account is in a different name. A facilities vendor sends details for a collection account nobody told you about. A short call sorts all of these out before a payment goes astray and turns into a reconciliation problem.
The check also creates a record. Somebody's name sits next to the confirmation, with the date and the number they dialed. When an account later turns out to be wrong, you can see who spoke to whom and what they were told.
Setting it up
Fix the contact source before you need it. At vendor onboarding, record a named finance contact and a phone number taken from the contract, the supplier's letterhead, or a call to the supplier's main switchboard. Write down where that number came from, because the origin is what makes it trustworthy. Ask the supplier at onboarding which people are allowed to request bank changes, and note that in the vendor record.
Separate the roles. The person who keys a change into the vendor record should not be the person who approves payments, and should not be the person making the callback. Anyone who wants to push a fraudulent change through has to fool more than one person, and that alone stops most of it.
Put a hold on the first payment to new details. Nothing goes out until the callback is complete and the change has sat for a short while. Use that time to compare the request against the record you already hold: legal name, address, tax identifier, the country the supplier actually operates in. A personal name where a company name used to be, a remit-to address in a country the supplier does not trade from, or a bank nobody has heard of are all reasons to slow down rather than speed up.
Keep a change log. Every entry gets the supplier, the date the request arrived, the date it was confirmed, who made the call, which number they dialed and where that number came from, who approved the update, and when the vendor record was changed in your ERP. File the original email with its headers alongside the entry. The log is what lets you answer questions months later without reconstructing everything from memory.
Where it falls short
The callback is only as good as the number you dial. If the number in the vendor record was planted by a fraudster in the first place, or was updated by a colleague who was taken in, you are calling the fraudster and getting a confident yes. That is why the provenance of the number matters more than the call itself. Numbers typed in from an email signature are weak. Numbers from a signed contract or from the supplier's own switchboard are strong.
Phone calls can be worked too. A fraudster who answers knows the invoice numbers, the payment terms, the name of your AP clerk and the tone your suppliers use. They will sound helpful and they will push for speed. A callback works better when the caller reads from a short script and asks the supplier to confirm the new account digits against their own bank records, rather than accepting a cheerful confirmation that everything is fine.
It is also a point in time control. It confirms the details at the moment of the call. It does nothing about a change made quietly next month, or a record edited after the check was filed. Reconcile the vendor record against the change log on a regular schedule and flag any account detail that has no matching confirmation line.
The gap people actually fall through is the exception. A supplier claims their account is frozen and a payment has to move today. Somebody senior approves it verbally and the callback gets skipped. Exceptions are where the control disappears, so decide in advance who can authorize one and make clear that the usual answer is to wait.
Checking that it works
Test the paperwork first. Pull a sample of vendor changes from the last few months and look for a confirmation line, a named caller, the number dialed and its source. Any change with no line is a finding on its own, whether or not that payment turned out fine. It tells you the process is being skipped.
Test the callback itself. Have someone outside AP send a change request that quotes a contact number different from the one on file, and watch whether AP calls the file number or the one in the message. Ask a friendly supplier what happened the last time they changed their details: did anyone call them, and did the caller ask them to read the account digits back.
Watch the pattern of requests. Changes that arrive just before a large payment, messages from a free webmail address, a reply-to that differs from the sender, a supplier who suddenly asks for all future remittances to a new bank: each is worth a second look even when everything else seems normal. Keep the list short and specific so people actually use it.
Report on the control in plain numbers you can defend: how many changes came in, how many were confirmed by callback, how many exceptions were granted, how long confirmation took from request to sign off. If confirmation regularly takes longer than the payment cycle allows, someone will start paying first and confirming later. Fix the queue length before that habit sets in.
Questions
Who should call to verify a vendor bank change?
Someone who does not approve payments and did not key the change into the vendor record. They dial a number already on file, from the contract or the supplier's switchboard, and never the number printed in the request. Their name and the number they called go into the change log.
The supplier says they cannot take a call and wants email confirmation instead. What now?
The payment waits. Email is how the request arrived, so email cannot also be the confirmation. Offer to call at a time that suits them, and if the pressure continues, treat that as a reason to look harder rather than a reason to move faster.
Is a bank change request on company letterhead safe to accept?
Letterhead is easy to copy and proves nothing on its own. Treat paper the same as email: confirm by phone with a known contact on a number already on file before the new details are used for any payment.
A payment already went to the wrong account. What do I do first?
Call your bank straight away and tell them the payment went to incorrect details, then call the real supplier on the number you hold. Keep the original request, the headers and your notes. Whether funds can be recovered depends on the bank, the jurisdiction and how quickly you act, so take advice from your bank and your own advisers.
Updated Nov 15, 2026. Figures on this page are calculated by ERPSav from the definitions shown. The explanatory text is drafted with AI from those figures and checked automatically before it is published. General information only, not legal, tax or financial advice.